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Conflict or Peace Language? Cover Texts of 2022 from 17 European and Non-European Countries*

Abstract

Using qualitative and quantitative methods, the study answers questions based on large cover texts in 2022 from high-circulation magazines from 17 countries (Argentina, Austria, Brazil, China, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, UK, US): #1. How many covers deal with the topic “West-Ukraine-Russia”? 124, most of them in Germany and France. — #2.1. What is the rough connotation? In Germany and France there were mainly anti-Russian titles. The Russian magazine ran mostly emotionally neutral, descriptive-objective texts. — #2.2. What finer techniques are used? Of the war rhetoric principles according to Ponsonby, we find particularly these: The enemy is solely responsible for war and deliberately commits atrocities; the enemy’s leader is the devil; our cause serves all and is sacred. A supplementary principle is: Diplomacy is ridiculous. The German, Polish, Dutch, British and French cover texts use such principles the most. — #3. What stylistic devices are used? — Most prominent are puns. Puns are typically European. The conceptual metaphor WAR IS PLAY is found especially in non-European areas. — #4. Do findings match with previous Europragmatic findings? By and large, yes; surprisingly low, however, is the degree of “Europeanness” in the Slovenian source.

Sommaire

Avec des méthodes qualitatives et quantitatives, l’étude répond à des questions basées sur de grands textes de couverture en 2022, de magazines à fort tirage de 17 pays (Allemagne, Argentine, Autriche, Brésil, Chine, États-Unis, France, Hongrie, Inde, Italie, Pays-Bas, Pologne, Portugal, Royaume-Uni, Russie, Slovénie, Suède): #1. Combien de couverture traitent du thème “Ouest-Ukraine-Russie”? 124, la plupart en Allemagne et en France. — #2.1. Quelle est la connotation approximative? En Allemagne et en France, il y avait surtout des titres anti-russes. Le magazine russe publiait pour la plupart des textes descriptifs et objectifs, émotionnellement neutres. — #2.2. Quelles techniques plus fines sont utilisées? Parmi les principes de la rhétorique de guerre selon Ponsonby, on trouve notamment ceux-ci: L’ennemi est seul responsable de la guerre et commet délibérément des atrocités; le chef de l’ennemi est le diable; notre cause sert tous et est sacrée. Un principe supplémentaire est: La diplomatie est ridicule. Les textes allemands, polonais, néerlandais, britanniques et français utilisent ces principes le plus. — #3. Quels moyens stylistiques sont utilisés? — Les jeux de mots sont les plus importants. Ils sont typiquement européens. La métaphore conceptuelle LA GUERRE EST UN JEU est surtout non européenne. — #4. Les résultats correspondent-ils aux résultats europragmatiques précédents? Dans l’ensemble, oui; mais le degré d’“européanité” de la source slovène est étonnamment bas.

Zusammenfassung

Die Studie beantwortet mit qualitativen und quantitativen Methoden Fragen auf Basis großer Covertexte des Jahres 2022 in auflagenstarken Zeitschriften aus 17 Ländern (Argentinien, Brasilien, China, Deutschland, Frankreich, Großbritannien, Indien, Italien, Niederlande, Österreich, Polen, Portugal, Russland, Slowenien, Schweden, Ungarn, USA): #1. Wie viele Cover befassen sich mit dem Thema „West-Ukraine-Russland“? 124, die meisten davon in Deutschland und Frankreich. — #2.1. Was ist die grobe Konnotation? In Deutschland und Frankreich gab es überwiegend antirussische Titel. Das russische Magazin veröffentlichte überwiegend emotional neutrale, beschreibend-sachliche Texte. — #2.2. Welche feineren Techniken werden verwendet? Von den Prinzipien der Kriegsrhetorik nach Ponsonby finden wir insbesondere diese: Der Feind ist allein für den Krieg verantwortlich und begeht vorsätzlich Gräueltaten; der Anführer des Feindes ist der Teufel; unsere Sache dient allen und ist heilig. Ein ergänzendes Prinzip ist: Diplomatie ist lächerlich. Die deutschen, polnischen, niederländischen, britischen und französischen Covertexte verwenden solche Prinzipien am häufigsten. — #3. Welche Stilmittel werden verwendet? — Am prominentesten sind Wortspiele. Sie sind typisch europäisch. Die konzeptionelle Metapher KRIEG IST SPIEL findet sich vor allem im außereuropäischen Raum. — #4. Stimmen die Ergebnisse mit früheren europragmatischen Erkenntnissen überein? Im Großen und Ganzen ja; überraschend niedrig ist jedoch der Grad der “Europäizität” der slowenischen Quelle.

* I would like to thank Andy Curtis (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, City University of Macau, SAR, PRC) for his helpful comments on this paper as well as a second colleague for his review.

1. Introduction: Background and Objectives

Political rhetoric can promote peace or war. And media play an important role in criticizing or reinforcing political propaganda. Arthur Ponsonby (1928) realized this when he tried to answer the question how World War One was possible. But the same rhetoric strategies he determined were also found in other wars of the 20th century (cf. Morelli 2001). Are they still used today, when we are facing the war in Ukraine? How are peace-promoting and conflict-promoting language distributed on magazine cover pages in different European and non-European languages? To this end, we will pursue a general comparison of the front pages on the topic of “the West, Russia, Ukraine” in 2022, more specifically after Russia’s invasion into Ukraine. First, the distribution of certain semantic, rhetoric and stylistic patterns will be analyzed. Then, we will see whether there are geographical clusters, particularly with respect to Europe. In this sense, the study falls into the field of Eurolinguistics.

Our study is, on the one hand, rooted in a more linguistic approach within peace linguistics, as propagated by Curtis (e.g. 2017, 2022) in his New Peace Linguistics approach, in order to realize and, ideally, understand how much or little peace-promoting language is used. Based on previous analyses, it was to be expected that conflict-promoting or reporting front pages would be found more frequently than peace- or reassurance-promoting ones (see, e.g., Wolfsfeld 2004: 16 et passim, Galtung/Ruge 1965). Furthermore, this paper tries to analyze whether the style of cover text corroborates, or not, findings on the distribution of other pragmalinguistic features on European languages (e.g. Grzega 2013).

Cover pages have first been brought to the center of linguistic attention by Held (2005). She describes covers as a “complete and holistic product consisting of visual and text, optic and stylistics, [a product that] deploys three codes, viz. picture, (typo-)graphy and language equally and simultaneously”, and this with “a wide range of functions and characteristic features which result from the constant tension C[overs] underlie in the pressure between convention and innovation, between professional ethics and economical competition” (Held 2005: 174). Apart from the language functions of representation, expression and appeal according to Bühler’s organon model (1934), Held (2005: 179) underlines the combination of presentation, information, opinion information and entertainment. Cover texts thus are “multimodal supertexts [with] calculated interdependence of visual and verbal elements” (Held 2005: 175). Further, she states that cover texts unite all three functions of the sign according to Peirce (1903): icon, index and symbol (Held 2005: 176). Held then further illustrates the presenting, teasing, guiding/directing and attraction functions by the help of contrasted French and Italian cover texts or cover headlines. If we want to follow Chomsky and Herman (1988), who claim that the product of the mass media is not the news, but the customer—and the client is not the customer, but the advertising space buyer—, then one may add that the least important function in cover texts is the (re)presenting one.

In a Eurolinguistic dimension, studies on magazine cover texts are very young (Grzega 2017, 2021). The presentation of war and other geopolitical issues in headlines has been analyzed in a Eurolinguistic dimension in Hanusch (2014), Hippler (2016), Würth (2017), Grzega (2019a: 93f.); Eurolinguistic studies with geopolitical cover texts have first been analyzed in Grzega (2019b). None of these works could of course have dealt with the Ukraine war after Russia’s invasion in February 2022. This phase of the Ukraine war (which had already started in 2014) was first analyzed contrastively in printed and online headlines (Tymbay 2022, Selimi 2023, Selimi/Zejnullahu 2023). An analysis on “Ukraine war” cover texts in a Eurolinguistic dimension was first carried out in Grzega (2023), where the presence of linguistic features in the selected media of a country was connected to the prominence of agreement to political statements asked in

an independent poll. The results: The more texts, the more respondents in a country are in favor of sanctions and arms deliveries and the fewer are against military intervention; furthermore, the more emotional texts, the fewer respondents are in favor of sanctions and the more against military intervention. It is the latter study that this present study hooks on, but it enlarges its corpus with respect to time period and sources and, moreover, includes different aspects.

2. Research Questions and Methodology

The precise research questions of this study are:

- #1. How many covers prominently cover the topic “the West, Ukraine, Russia” in the period given?
- #2.1 What is the distribution of the rough semantic (connotative) orientation of the cover texts?
- #2.2.a. Which finer semantic aspects appear clustered?
- #2.2.b. How are these geographically/culturally distributed?
- #3.a. What stylistic devices occur in clusters?
- #3.b. How are they geographically/culturally distributed?
- #4. Do the geographical/cultural findings match with previous Europragmatic observations?

To answer the questions on the presence and distribution of connotative, finer semantic and stylistic qualities, the paper foremostly aims to be descriptive and therefore first resorts to established theories. Nevertheless, the study will add geolinguistic information and formulate some ideas to enhance models or theories.

For the rough semantic (connotative) orientation, we will proceed similarly to Selimi (2023), who makes a distinction between pro-Russian, pro-Ukrainian, and objective newspaper headlines after a framing analysis. In this paper, we will call the categories pro-Russian/anti-Western, pro-Western/anti-Russian, and objective-descriptive. By objective-descriptive, we mean a descriptive, objective and neutral view of an event without a choice of emotional(izing) words. More details and examples will be presented in the respective analysis section.

For the finer semantic aspects, we will refer to the ten war rhetoric axioms as first described by Ponsonby (1928) for World War I and confirmed for other wars by Morelli (2001), to wit:

1. We do not want war.
2. The opposite party alone is guilty of war.
3. The enemy is inherently evil and resembles the devil.
4. We defend a noble cause, not our own interests.
5. Our cause is sacred.
6. The enemy uses forbidden weapons.
7. We suffer small losses, those of the enemy are enormous.
8. Recognized artists and intellectuals back our cause.
9. The enemy commits atrocities on purpose; our mishaps are involuntary.
10. All who doubt our propaganda are traitors.

Note that Principles #3 and #5 use (or misuse) religious (Christian) imagery. We will examine the extent to which these and all other principles are reflected in coverlines and in verbal elements of the pictures.

The analysis of stylistic devices is similar to the one of Bonyadi/Samuel (2013). However, not all categories from their study occur in our corpus. On the other hand, there are stylistic means in our

corpus that are not present in their corpus. More details will be presented in the respective analysis section.

Finally, for a comparison to prior pragmalinguistic research in a European, or Eurolinguistic, dimension, we resort to the observations in Grzega (2013). There, several smaller studies were carried out. The results were presented in a map where the links among countries with descending percentages of European features, defined as features occurring in at least 66 percent or 75 percent in a truly European selection of languages, look like the flight of a bumblebee.

To collect a truly Eurolinguistic corpus (cf. Grzega 2012, 2013), we will gather the relevant 2022 front pages (from 24 March 2022 to 31 December 2022) of twelve political weekly newspapers from all cultural sub-areas of Europe (north, west, southwest, south, southeast, east, center; both larger and smaller countries). These weeklies are described in various Wikipedia versions as having the highest circulation in the country:

Austria (AT): Falter
 France (FR): Le Point
 Germany (DE): Der Spiegel
 Hungary (HU): hvg
 Italy (IT): Espresso
 Netherlands (NL): EW Weekblad
 Poland (PL): Polityka
 Portugal (PT): Visão
 Russia (RU): Argumenty i Fakty
 Slovenia (SI): Mladina
 Sweden (SE): Fokus
 United Kingdom (UK): The Economist

One may argue that at least two magazines per country should be selected, one of politically left orientation and one of politically right orientation. However, some countries do not have more than one relevant weekly; moreover, the definition of “politically left” and “politically right” have been described as changing and this in different ways in different countries (Jahn 2022); this may all the more be true of mass media. Several countries do not have the tradition of weekly party-independent non-tabloid political magazines (any longer), for instance Spain, Norway, Ireland, the Czech Republic. For comparison, in order to detect European particularities, the highest-circulation political weeklies of some non-European countries are included as well, namely the largest countries by population in North America (USA), Latin America (Brazil), East Asia (China) and South Asia (India). The largest country by population in Africa (Nigeria) does not have a political weekly of its own. In addition, the ten largest countries of the world were respected, provided they had a widely read political weekly. One may also miss a Spanish medium, since, after all, Spanish is also the European world language with most native speakers. However, Spain no longer has a national political weekly. The first choice outside Europe would be Mexico, which is the country with the highest number of native speakers of Spanish; however, I was not given access to *Siempre!* cover pages of 2022, only earlier ones. Since Colombia as the country with the second largest number of native speakers does not feature a political weekly either, we resort to Argentina. This gives us the following additional list of countries.

United States of America (US): Newsweek
 China (CN): Beijing Report (in English)
 India (IN): India Today

Argentina (AR): Noticias de la semana

Brazil (BR): Veja

The front pages can be viewed on the internet (see URL01 to URL18).

The cover pages examined cover the period from February 1 to December 31, 2022, i.e. 48 weeks. Only the central cover image with the associated text and, where applicable, additional texts in prominent font and set off by an image were taken into account. Country abbreviation and issue number of the year 2022 or—in the case of UK, FR and PT—the system MMDD (month/day) are used for referencing.

The theoretical rationale for comparing this type of linguistic data lies in the fact that linguists and psychologists have used the term *propaganda* to describe how special techniques can influence people's thoughts and feelings, e.g. Lippmann (1922); today, the influencing of thoughts by networks of words and sentences is also referred to as framing, as illustrated by Tversky/Kahneman (1981) and Chomsky/Herman (1988), for example. For this study, we now examined the front pages of nationally distributed, highest-circulation political weeklies, since these are messages that people in a country perceive even if they do not buy the magazine or newspaper—they see them, at least unconsciously, as passersby, since they are widely available in supermarkets, small stores, and newsstands. Such sources can be considered typical representatives of the national media language or discourse. In contrast, news in social media does have an impact on recipients, but is more autonomously selected by them or more individually created by algorithms, e.g., Bucher (2018). TV news programs, like social media, can also be avoided, while magazine and newspaper covers, as mentioned earlier, are widely used on the way to purchase daily necessities. Thus, in view of the cross-cultural question and the lack of data on specific individual media habits related to individual political attitudes, newspaper and magazine covers are methodologically more appropriate than social media news and TV programs.

3. Analyses

3.1. Analysis 1

We first add up the cover pages with main texts and their subtexts as well as large secondary texts with pictures on the topic complex “the West, Ukraine, Russia”, while excluding front pages without text (just a picture), such as SI-11. The picture in Fig. 1 emerges (slightly grayed background when at least 20% percent of the issues were relevant, strongly grayed background when at least 25% were relevant).

country	main text	main text + large 2ndary text
CN	0	0
IN	1	1
AR	1	1
PT	2	2
BR	4	4
US	4	4
SI	4	4
SE	2	5
HU	6	8
NL	6	8
IT	8	10
RU	8	10
PL	11	11
AT	9	11
UK	9	12
FR	9	15
DE	13	18
sum	97	124

Fig. 1: Number Geopolitical Covers

This illustrates that most of the front pages with geopolitical west/east theme can be found in the German magazine, and the fewest—namely none—in the Chinese one.

3.2. Analysis 2

3.2.1. Analysis 2.1

Let us now take those countries in which more than one fifth of the weeks contained relevant front pages. As already said, we classify the texts into descriptive-objective (= emotionally neutral, purely descriptive) and emotional-subjective texts. Of course, the picture will most probably, as this is its task, arouse emotions in the reader; this study is interested, though, in analyzing whether the verbal part, through the semantics of words, is also emotional in itself. Or does journalistic neutrality prevail, if it exists at all (cf., e.g., Chomsky/Herman 1988, Ojala 2021, Ward 2022)? This means, for instance, that a pattern “X killed” is classified as descriptive-objective; in contrast, “X brutally killed” or “X slaughtered” would count as emotional-subjective. Also, it would mean that “X says he wants Y” and “According to A X wants Y” would count as descriptive-objective, while “X wants Y” as a pure assumption without a source or a verbum dicendi would fall under the category emotional-subjective. Whether statements are true or not are not important here. A question such as “What military move is X planning next?” is descriptive-objective, while “What atrocity is X planning next?” is emotional-subjective. A classification as descriptive-objective does

not mean that the cover page as a whole cannot be emotional; the picture, as already said, and the message *per se* may trigger strong emotions. Also of note, a lack of emotional words does not mean that a coverline cannot be manipulative, as Tymbay (2022) aims to show through illustrating logical fallacies and wrong generalizations; however, if these things occur in our coverlines they were put into the emotional-subjective category.

We sub-classify the emotional-subjective pages into pro-Western/anti-Russian, pro-Russian/anti-Western and critical-of-own-government pages. We then receive the distribution shown in Fig. 2.

country	descriptive-objective	critical of own government	pro-Western/anti-Russian	anti-Western/pro-Russian
AT	5	0	6	0
DE	6	3	9	0
PL	6	2	3	0
UK	7	0	5	0
FR	4	1	10	0
RU	8	0	0	2
IT	4	2	4	0

Fig. 2: Rough Semantics of Texts

So while Russia, interestingly, shows the strongest descriptive-objective/neutral style (80%), Germany and France show a relatively high proportion of subjective-emotional cover texts (at least two-thirds) on this geopolitical topic. Austria, Poland, Italy and the UK typically alternate between objective and subjective cover texts (40% to 60%). A clear European characteristic does not emerge. If the distribution of Dutch and Hungarian texts were added, the picture does not become any clearer: The Dutch medium would be clearly on the descriptive-objective side with 7 out of 8 texts, while the Hungarian medium would be clearly on the emotional-subjective side with 7 out of 8 texts.

3.2.2. Analysis 2.2

As already said, war rhetoric was first described by Ponsonby (1928) for World War I and confirmed for other wars by Morelli (2001). We will repeat these ten war-rhetoric principles (WRP) and comment and illustrate their presence in our texts, in a kind of framing analysis. (I will quote and translate relevant coverlines and verbal elements of pictures, but, due to the goal of this study, refrain from a description of the pictures *per se* unless this is necessary for the classification of the coverline; short vertical lines in the quotes and translations indicate line breaks in the original.)

1. WRP: We do not want war. (Only the enemy wants it). — Interestingly, this does not really occur in the coverlines examined here. This lack will be commented on after this annotated list. — On SI-09, we read *Mir* ‘Peace’ in front of a rainbow flag, but this is meant as a real call for peace, not as excuse that war must continue because the opponent wants it.
2. WRP: The opposite party alone is guilty of war. — Applied to our topic, this means two things:
 - (1) The blame for the war is attributed to Putin (and Russia) alone in the Western media, and to the West alone in the Russian paper. The former is explicitly stated in DE-09 (*Putins Krieg* ‘Putin’s war’), DE-32 (the subtitle speaks of ‘Putin’s war’), PL-10 (*Stalinowska wojna Putina*

‘Putin’s Stalinist war’). In HU-09, Putin is referred to as *világrendbontó* ‘world order-breaker’, pictured next to a missile; HU-10 talks about ‘Putin’s rampage’. IT-13 refers to the war as *scatenato da Putin* ‘unleashed by Putin’. NL-10 *Poetins pad naar oorlog* ‘Putin’s path to war’ could be added here. In the Russian medium this strategy is missing.

(2) For the respective opposite side, only negative symbols are shown. As a negative symbol for Russia, the Western media use the letter Z, while the Russian medium draws on Nazi symbols. This is found in PL-15 and PL-20 (Pope Francis looks through a Z-shaped hole behind a black sheet: *Wojna według Franciszka | Wypowiedzi papieża szokują. O co mu chodzi?* ‘War according to Francis | The Pope’s statements are shocking. What does he mean by that?’), HU-37 (incorporated as a creative word division in the word GÁ|Z ‘gas’) and SE-12. In UK-0310 a Z on a tank is incorporated in the text *The Stalinization of Russia*; however, since this composition does not clearly put the exclusive blame on the UK, this cover is here only categorized as an example of the WRP 3 (cf. next section). In RU-21, the neo-Nazi Azov Regiment is the cover theme (with explicit reference to the Nuremberg denazification trials in the subtitle and a man appropriate neo-Nazi tatoos placed in front of a photo from the Nuremberg trials).

— Principle 2 is thus found in two-thirds of the EU countries studied and Russia. Interestingly, SI-26 blames capitalism of the war (*Kaj pa vojna? | To, kar gledamo, je le še divjanje golega kapitalizma* ‘What about the war? What we are seeing is the rampage of naked capitalism’).

3. WRP: The (leader of the) enemy is inherently evil and resembles the devil. — We can add: the devil or a figure perceived as similarly evil. Thus, Putin is explicitly portrayed with negative symbolism in the Western media, while Western state leaders are portrayed negatively in Russia. In FR-0602, Putin is considered *diabolique* ‘diabolic’ (along with Turkish President Erdoğan); in FR-1006, he is dubbed a possessed man (*forcené*). BR-08 sees him *num delirio de grandeza e nostalgia do passado soviético* ‘in a delirium of grandeur and nostalgia of the Soviet past’. FR-0317 places him next to Ivan the Terrible (*D’Ivan le Terrible à Vladimir Poutine*). On FR-0714, Stalin is featured as the cover photo and is described in the small text as an ‘inspiration of Putin and Xi’. In PL-10, Putin is Stalin-bearded, with the title *Stalinowska wojna Putina* ‘Stalin’s war of Putin’. In FR-1215 he is seen in the picture together with Stalin, Hitler, Gaddafi and Mao next to the title *Comment finissent les dictateurs* ‘How dictators end up’. In NL-47 he is lined up—also textually—with Hitler and Saddam: *Hoe dictators als Hitler, Saddam en Poetin zich steeds verkeken op de kracht van democratieën* ‘How dictators like Hitler, Saddam and Putin always looked askance at the power of democracies’. On AT-16, *Putin, der Schreckliche* ‘Putin the Terrible’ again alludes to Tsar Ivan the Terrible and dubs Putin a dictator in the subtitle. IT-14 employs the pseudo-Russian word *disinformatja* and depicts Putin with his right arm extended, in black and white, which could be reminiscent of a Hitler salute. In DE-26 he is drawn as a devil with horns and dubbed an “icer” (or literally “cold-maker”), being a pun on Russia’s reduction of sending gas and the verb *kaltmachen* ‘literally: make cold’ for ‘kill’ (like E. *ice*). In DE-11, the subtitle to *Kann er noch zurück?* ‘Can he still go back?’ with guns in Putin’s head reads: *Leben wie unter Stalin* ‘Living as under Stalin’. In UK-0310, moreover, current Russia is seen in a phase of (re-)Stalinization and Putin is thus equated with Stalin as well (*The Stalinization of Russia*). In AR-0305 he is called *[El nuevo] Tsar* ‘[The new] Tsar’, in pseudo-Cyrillic characters. In addition, there are somewhat weaker negative representations, in the form of mental illness images: Mention has already been made of the designation as a ‘man possessed’ in FR-1006. HU-10 speaks of ‘Putin’s rampage’. SE-07 reads: *I huvudet på Putin | Presidentens plan är djupt rotad i rysk idétradition* ‘In Putin’s head [or put a flea in Putin’s ear, according to the idiom *att sätta en idé i huvudet på någon*] | The president’s plan is deeply rooted in the Russian tradition of ideas’. Other negative representations can be found in IT-14, IT-27, FR-

0310, FR-0224, UK-0224, and US-0902.

— In Slovenia, Prime Minister Janez Janša can be ridiculed as being like Putin (nationalist, pious and a close friend of Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán's) (SI-10). Interestingly, this strategy does not occur in the Russian media. It is typical for the “(North)Western” media (with the exception of Hungary and Portugal) and the two Latin American media.

4. WRP: We defend a noble cause, not our own interests . — This creation of “value community” is expressed in two ways:

(1) there is talk of “the West” (FR-0224, NL-09, SE-13, HU-09, AT-16, AT-38) or of “Europe,” with “Europe” excluding Russia (DE-10, NL-10, UK-0716, FR-0324, FR-0407, HU-42), with the exception of Portugal, Poland, and the Americas. In FR-0317, *La Russie et nous* ‘Russia and us’ also suggests, based on the illustration, that “us” means the West. The meaning of “Europe” remains unclear, though, in UK-0318 and IT-27. The Russian medium, on the other hand, emphasizes assistance to the entire Russian ethnic group (including Russian minorities in Ukraine). Thus, RU-09 addresses the refugee issue with the headline *Чем им можно помочь?* ‘What can be done to help them [refugees, as in the picture]?’ RU-40 has the title *Ответ на призыв* ‘Answer to the [call for] help’ for partial mobilization next to a father and his child in his arms. Surprisingly, US-0617 shows that not all are served in the war: *Children of war | The damage to Ukraine’s kids will long outlast the war. Inside the struggle to save them.*

(2) There are Western front pages with Ukrainian text and colors. However, this ritual-like aspect could also be included under the next principle.

5. WRP: Our cause is sacred. — Transferred to our subject:

(1) Here, as just mentioned, one could place the last aspect from the previous principle. There are Western front pages with Ukrainian text. In AT-13 ‘Welcome to Vienna’ is written in Ukrainian. In PT-0303 the slogan *Slava Ukraini* is used, literally ‘Glory to Ukraine’ (it is also translated as such on the cover in Portuguese); however, the slogan was the typical greeting of Ukrainian Nazis, so some translate this phrase parallel to Nazi greetings (URL19, URL20). In addition, there are front pages with text in or in front of Ukrainian colors of the national flag: AT-13, AT-09, PL-17, PL-44, PL-11, PL-13, PL-14, PL-16, FR-0303, SE-09, HU-10, HU-24, HU-46, PT-0303 (magazine title), BR-09 (magazine title). In the Russian media, this rhetorical device does not exist.

(2) In the West, Zelensky’s struggle is presented as heroic, in the Russian media, that of Putin. This is the case in HU-15, SE-09, DE-12, NL-13, FR-0303, as well as AT-09 and UK-0331 (where the main coverline *Resistance to Putin* with the subtitle *How long will Ukraine hold out?* and *Why Ukraine must win* convey uncertainty about a positive development. In PT-1222 the title is *O ano da coragem e da incerteza* ‘The year of courage and of uncertainty’; above it we see Zelensky of Putin; though not fully explicit most will connect Zelensky with the first/left noun *coragem* ‘courage’. Zelensky’s profession as an actor is alluded to twice: NL-13 coverlines *In de rol van zijn leven* ‘In the role of his life’ and similarly the secondary title in SE-09 (*Ukrainas president Volodymyr Zelensky spelar sitt livs viktigaste roll* ‘Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky plays the most important role of his life’). RU-39 celebrates the referendum in Donbass (*Донбасс сердце России | Операция на сердце | Донбасс возвращается домой* ‘Donbass, Russia’s heart | Operation on the heart | Donbass returns home’) as well as destruction and reconstruction of the symbolic Crimean Bridge are addressed (RU-41, RU-49).

— Interesting in this context is the main title *Operation Seebeben* ‘Operation Seaquake’ with the subtitle *Krieg am Meeresgrund: So verwundbar ist unsere Infrastruktur* ‘War at the bottom of the sea: So vulnerable is our infrastructure’ in DE-40: it leaves the presumed perpetrator completely open, although there were already references to the US at the time (cf. URL21); the title has not been included here because it makes no reference to Russia or

Ukraine.

6. WRP: The enemy uses forbidden weapons. — Transferred to our context: The nuclear threat on Putin's part is discussed in the West, but not on the part of the West. Conversely, this would be expected for the Russian medium. — Only UK-0604 and SI-41 deal with the danger of a nuclear war in general (which can be started by both sides). In the Russian media there is nothing about the nuclear threat.
7. WRP: We suffer small losses, those of the enemy are enormous. — This is done in DE-09 (*Putins Desaster* 'Putin's disaster') and DE-12 (*Gefährlich schwach* 'Dangerously weak', picturing Putin with a black eye in the silhouette of Ukraine, subtitled: *Alles auf Krieg: Was Putin jetzt riskiert, um sich zu retten* 'All out for war: What Putin is risking now to save himself') and in UK-0428 (*How rotten is Russia's army?*) and US-0902 (*What Putin got wrong*). In NL-47 *De triomf van het Westen* 'The triumph of the West' is prophesied. In RU-39, the referendum in Donbass is celebrated (*Донбасс сердце России | Операция на сердце | Донбасс возвращается домой* 'Donbass, Russia's heart | Operation on the heart | Donbass returns home') and the reconstruction of the symbolic Crimean Bridge is highlighted, after its destruction had been depicted a few weeks earlier (RU-41, RU-49).
8. WRP: Artists and intellectuals back our cause. — There was little to be found on this. In Germany, which owes its reunification mainly to the then Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev, he is described, after his death, in DE-36 as *Der Anti-Putin* 'The Anti-Putin', as an "intellectual for the West" as it were. This conceals the fact that especially in international politics Gorbachev supported Putin's views (e.g. URL22, URL23). In addition, there are other negative portrayals. In the Russian media, on the other hand, titles directed against single individuals cannot be found. Furthermore, it is noticeable that when Pope Francis is critical of the West, the latter faces criticism (see point 10).
9. WRP: The enemy systematically commits cruelties; our mishaps are involuntary. — Applied to our subject matter, this can be summarized in three ways:
 - (1) The cruelty or bloodiness of war is depicted. FR-0407 is titled *La stratégie du carnage* 'The strategy of slaughter' (with a dog next to a dead cyclist in the picture, possibly intended to evoke other words with *carn-* such as *carnassier* 'predator' and *carnivore* 'carnivorous'). The title of DE-18 is *Putins blutige Spur* 'Putin's bloody trail', that of IT-11 *Impero di sangue* 'blood empire; blood rule'.
 - (2) The energy supply problem and the food crisis are concretely related to the war. Energy supply is addressed in NL-12, FR-0825, IT-09, HU-18, HU-37, and AT-11, where this is directly linked to Putin or Russia without making clear that the EU itself rejected Russian gas as part of its sanctions policy. In UK-0716 (*Europe's coming winter peril*), a threat from Russia in this regard is only depicted figuratively: Little Red Riding Hood walks through a forest of gas pipelines while a bear (symbol for Russia) lies in wait for her. In contrast, in PL-14 the energy supply with Russian gas and in FR-0313 the food crisis are presented in a more general and vague way, respectively.
 - (3) There is speculation about further war intentions of Putin. UK-0224 writes *Where will he stop?* with a tank in Putin's mind. PL-19 does this in combination with a picture of Russian soldiers in goose step at ceremonies commemorating the Russian victory over the Nazis: *9 maja | Czy Putin ogłosi zwycięstwo czy nową wojnę?* 'May 9 | Will Putin declare victory or a new war?'. NL-10 reads *Poetins pad naar oorlog | Russenangst terug in Europa* 'Putin's way to war | Russenangst back in Europe'. US-0311 writes before the main text *Putin's endgame: Invading Ukraine is just the beginning. What is the Russian leader's ultimate goal?*. In HU-42, cyberwar is alluded to: www.kiberhabo.ru (separating *kiberháború* 'cyberwar' in a way that *ru* is left as the Russian Internet country code).
10. WRP: All who doubt our propaganda are traitors. — In total, one strong form and five mild forms are seen here:

(1) Other supporters of Putin are shown in DE-32 (*Er ist das Volk* ‘He is the people’, alluding to the slogan of the 1989/90 GDR Monday demonstrators *Wir sind das Volk* ‘We are the people’, with reference to the large support among the Russian population, as is clear in the subtitle: Why so many Russians are for Putin’s war) and likewise in IT-10 (*Fratelli di Putin* ‘Brothers of Putin’, alluding to the title of the Italian national anthem *Fratelli d’Italia*, with reference to Putin-friendly *Politica, Banche, Enti di Stato, Ambasciatori, Rai* ‘Politics, Banks, State Authorities, Ambassadors, Rai [= state broadcasting]’).

(2) The view of the other side or critics do not play a role (or should not play a role). Due to his differentiated point of view, the pope faces criticism in PL-20 (Title: *Wojna wedlug Franciszka | Wypowiedzi papieža szokują. O co mu chodzi?* ‘War according to Francis | The Pope’s statements are shocking. What does he mean by that?’). In DE-17 and DE-24, the German government has to put up with criticism of doing too little (*Wovor haben Sie Angst, Herr Scholz?* ‘What are you afraid of, Mr. Scholz?’ and *Im Stich gelassen?* ‘Let down?’) Interestingly, NL-40 (*Poetin verklaart de oorlog aan het westen* ‘Putin declares war to/on the West’, with a double entendre) also gives Putin’s view of the war and the West in the form of a quote, although it is probably meant to seem ridiculous. The quote is above Putin’s head, given as a red silhouette against a black background: *Westerse landen zeggen al eeuwen dat ze andere landen vrijheid en democratie brengen. Niets is minder waar. In plaats van democratie te brengen, onderdrukten en exploiteerden zij, en in plaats van vrijheid te geven, maakten zij slaven en onderdrukten. De unipolaire wereld is inherent antidemocratisch en onvrij; ze is door en door vals en hypocriet.* [bold in original] ‘Western countries have been saying for centuries that they bring freedom and democracy to other countries. Nothing is less true. Instead of bringing democracy, they oppressed and exploited, and instead of giving freedom, they made slaves and oppressed. The unipolar world is inherently anti-democratic and unfree; it is thoroughly false and hypocritical.’ DE-32 also announces in its title a view of the adversary: *Er ist das Volk | Warum so viele Russen für Putins Krieg sind* ‘He is the people | Why so many Russians are in favor of Putin’s war’.

(3) The question about the effect of military strategies is rarely or never asked. In fact, it is not asked on any of the covers studied.

(4) The question about the effect of economic strategies is rarely or never asked. In fact, it is only a cover question in UK-0827 (*Are sanctions working?*).

(5) The potential problems associated with accepting refugees are rarely if ever posed. In fact, only in US-0318 does it say *Can Europe handle the strain?* (next to a picture with refugees). In RU-09, refugees from eastern Ukraine are thematized in such a way that there is no problem, but answers: (*Чем им можно помочь?* ‘What can be done to help them [refugees, as in the picture]?’). (6) Putin and Xi are portrayed as a negative couple for the West. Thus in UK-0319 (*The alternative world order* with Putin next to an even taller Xi), FR-0421 (*Les nouvelles menaces vues par la CIA* ‘The new threats according to the CIA’), and SE-13. In SE-13, the title *Du och jag, Xi!* ‘You and I, Xi!’ alludes to a scene in which Astrid Lindgren’s Emil of Lönneberga expresses to Alfred, the farmhand, in a summer scene by the lake of both their friendship, “Du och jag, Alfred!” ‘You and I, Alfred!’. An interesting variation is offered by BR-11, where Macron and Zelensky are portrayed as Biden’s chess pieces and Putin as Xi’s chess piece, subtitled *Jogos de guerra* ‘War games’.

— In the Russian media, all this is missing in this strict form. In RU-23, Scholz, observed by Biden, is shown in a rather amusing sanctions cartoon saying *Что еще отморозум себе запад назою России...* ‘What else will the West freeze [= ban itself from] to annoy Russia...’. In RU-24 it is amused that the US is still a main consumer of Russian ice-cream, which is then called a ‘cold weapon’.

As already mentioned, it is astonishing that there are no examples of Principle 1, “We do not want

war”. Rather, the explicit opposite can be observed. Weapons, military strength and military victory are discussed and propagated more than a quick end to the war, military reduction, diplomacy and peace. Clear examples are DE-07 (*Wovor haben Sie Angst, Herr Scholz?* ‘What are you afraid of, Mr. Scholz?’), DE-10 (*Im Stich gelassen? Das hohle Versprechen von der deutschen Zeitenwende* ‘Let down? The hollow promise of the German turnaround’), FR-0324 (*Sait-on encore se défendre?* ‘Can we still defend ourselves?’) as well as UK-0602 (*How to win the long war*) and UK-0917 (*Getting the job done | How Ukraine can win*). The focus on ending the war is only marginally found: in NL-09 (*Hoe te stoppen* ‘How to stop’) and PT-33 (Subtitle *Como travar Putin?* ‘How to slow Putin down’). The word for “peace” occurs once in SI-09 (*Mir* ‘Peace’), in UK-1112 (*Imagining Peace in Ukraine*) and once in DE-08, where it is unclear whether this has to be interpreted as supportive or rather sarcastic or ironic: The Green ministers Annalena Baerbock (with sunflower, the Ukrainian national flower) and Robert Habeck as well as Green chairman Anton Hofreiter, all three in military dress, are provided with the words *Die Olivgrünen | Frieden schaffen mit mehr Waffen: Die Mobilmachung der Ökopartei* ‘The Olive-Greens | Making peace with more weapons: The mobilization of the eco-party’. The word for “diplomacy” appears only once, in the subtitles of IT-40, but negatively. Diplomacy, peace and disarmament are even ridiculed: In IT-40 the main text reads *Ombre russe* ‘Russian shadows’, while three lines below it, after also referring to the *incubo nucleare* ‘nuclear nightmare’, it reads: *E la diplomazia spera di centrare l’obiettivo minimo: la trega* ‘And diplomacy hopes to achieve the minimum goal: ceasefire’. The rainbow peace flag is seen in an ironical way (in front of a tank) in IT-13, along with the words *pace e martello* ‘peace and hammer’ in allusion to the Communist and Soviet Russian symbols *falce e martello* ‘hammer and sickle; literally, sickle and hammer’ respectively. IT-18 reads *Disarmo a sinistra* ‘Left disarmament’ (next to a praying woman in front of house debris). The dove of peace (on which Putin sits) appears on AT-15 with the words *Die Logik des Krieges | [Bundeskanzler] Karl Niehammer auf umstrittener Friedensmission* ‘The logic of war | [Chancellor] Karl Niehammer on a controversial peace mission’. As a new eleventh war rhetoric principle, as it were complementary to the model of Ponsonby and Morelli, one could thus say: diplomacy is ridiculous (and at best not worth mentioning).

Overall, the following distribution of war rhetoric principles (WRP) can be observed (cf. Fig. 3: the exclamation mark indicates that this is particularly common and is therefore included with 0.25 points more; the brackets say that this occurs only in mild form here and is therefore included with 0.25 points less; the minus is included with 1 point less): The regional cluster of German, Polish, Dutch, British, and French cover texts drew on the majority of Ponsonby’s war rhetoric principles (see also Fig. 4; shades of gray indicate strength).

WRP	BR	AR	US	UK	PT	IT	NL	FR	DE	AT	SI	HU	PL	SE	RU	IN	CN
1																	
2				+		+	+		+			+	+	+	+		
3	+	+	(+)			+	+	+	+	+		(+)	+	(+)			
4				+			+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+		
5	+			+	+		+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+		
6							+		+				+				
7			+	+			+		+				+				
8									+								
9			+	+		+	+	+	+	+		+	+				
10	+			(+)				+	(+)					(+)			
Σ_{1-10}	3	1	2.5	5.5	1	3	7	5	8.5	4		4.5	7	4	3	0	0
11						+				+							
Σ_{1-11}	3	1	2.5	5.5	1	4	7	5	8.5	5	0	4.5	7	4	3	0	0

Fig. 3: Distribution of War-Rhetoric Principles I




Fig. 4: Distribution of War-Rhetoric Principles II

3.3. Analysis 3

If we now look at the rhetorical-stylistic means, the following techniques stand out:

1. Puns (21x in total, in 8 countries): The frequencies of this most frequent stylistic device are:
 - 5 times IT (IT-10 *Fratelli di Putin* ‘Brothers of Putin’ alluding to the Italian national anthem *Fratelli d’Italia* ‘Brothers of Italy’, IT-13 *Pace e martello* ‘Peace and hammer’ alluding to the phrase for the communism symbols *falce e martello* ‘sickle and hammer; hammer and sickle’, IT-14 *Disinformatja* as a pseudo-Russian word, since the Russian word would have to be transliterated as *desinformatsija* in everyday press, IT-36 *Ottobre nero* ‘Black October’ for the threat of energy shortage blamed on Putin, possibly in allusion to the Palestinian terrorist organization Settembre nero ‘Black September’, IT-40 *Ombre russe* ‘Russian shadows’ in allusion to the John Wayne western classic *Ombre rosse* ‘Red shadows’ [in the original *Stagecoach*]);
 - 3 times DE (DE-12 Zelensky, Klichko and others as *Die Unbeugsamen* in allusion to the 1962 classic US movie *Der Unbeugsame* [in the original: *Cool Hand Luke*], DE-18 *Die Olivgrünen* ‘The Olive Greens’ to designate the militaristically minded Greens—in olive drab military

uniform—, DE-26 Putin as *Der Kaltmacher*, ambiguously interpretable as ‘someone who does not provide heat’ and ‘someone who kills people’, so that it could be translated as ‘The icer’), DE-32 *Er ist das Volk* ‘He is the people’, alluding to the slogan of the GDR peace movement *Wir sind das Volk* ‘We are the people’);

3 times PL (PL-11 *Uciezka do Polski* ‘Exodus to Poland’ parallels biblical *ucieczka do Egiptu* ‘Exodus to Egypt’, PL-16 *Święta i wojna* ‘Holy [Easter] and War’ alluding to *Święta wojna* ‘Holy War; Jihad’ and a Soviet song written after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, possibly, PL-20 *Wojna wedlug Franciszka* alluding to John Irving’s classic *Świat wedlug Garpa* [in the original *The World According to Garp*]);

2 times SE (SE-09 *Folkets tjärnare* ‘Servant of the people’, the Swedish translation of Zelensky’s TV series, in which he plays the Ukrainian president; SE-13 *Du och jag, Xi!* ‘You and me, Xi!’, alluding to a scene from Astrid Lindgren’s *Emil of Lönneberga*, where Emil and Alfred reaffirm their friendship);

2 times FR (FR-0602 *Les diaboliques* ‘The diabolics’, alluding to a classic 1955 film starring Simone Signoret, and FR-0310 *L’éradicateur*, roughly translatable as ‘exterminator’, since *éradiquer* is usually the translation for Hitler’s formula of exterminating the Jews);

2 times HU (HU-10 *Nincs mentség* ‘There is no excuse’, alluding to the book title of a former colonel of the State Security Service during the Warsaw Pact period, HU-15 *Új hősök tere* ‘New Heroes’ Square’, probably alluding to Budapest’s Heroes’ Square);

2 times RU (RU-23 *Чмо еше отморозум себе занад назло России...* ‘What else will the West freeze [= ban itself from] doing to annoy Russia...?’, next to a caricatured German Chancellor Scholz, who can’t fry his sausage anymore, and RU-24, where Russian ice-cream, which is still popular with US-Americans, is called a ‘cold weapon’);

1 time AT (AT-16 *Putin, der Schreckliche* ‘Putin, the Terrible’);

1 time NL (NL-47 *De triomf van het Western*, in view of the image design to be understood as an allusion to Pieter van Bruegel’s painting *De triomf van de dood* ‘The Triumph of Death’).

2. Graphic games, which do not appear explicitly in Bonyadi/Samuel (2013) and could possibly be placed among word games (7 occurrences in total, in 5 countries): The frequencies of this type are:

2 times HU (HU-37 *GÁZ* ‘gas’ is separated so that Z comes in a separate line as a symbol for the Russian military, HU-42 *www.kiberhabo.ru*, where *kiberháború* ‘cyber war’ is split so that *ru* becomes the Russian Internet country ending);

2 times PL (PL-15 a Z on the cap of a Russian military man, PL-20 Pope Francis looking through a black leaf with a hole in Z shape);

1 time each in UK, SE, and AR (Z on a tank incorporated into the collocation *The Stalinization of Russia* on UK-0310, Z on a tank in the picture of SE-12, *zar* with Z plus Cyrillic letters resembling A and R but actually representing the sounds [d] and [ya] in AR-0305).

3. Questions (20 occurrences, in 9 countries): The prominence of this second most frequent device is:

4 times FR (FR-0324, FR-0825 as well as in minor heading FR-0224, FR-0310 as well as in smaller font FR-1006);

4 times DE (DE-11, DE-17, DE-25 as well as non-finite DE-24 *Im Stich gelassen?* ‘Abandoned?’ and in smaller type DE-09, DE-44);

3 times UK (UK-0224, UK-0428, UK-0827);

2 times RU (RU-09, RU-21);

2 times PL (in subheading PL-19 and PL-20);

2 times in SI (SI-26 and in the subheading of SI-41);

1 time AT (AT-38);

1 time PT (PT-0303);

1 time in US-0318 (subheading) (as well as in smaller type US-0311).

- Statement sentences, however, are found only thrice in large type, but several times in smaller type): US-0902, US-0311, FR-1215 and in smaller type US-0614; UK-0331 as well as in smaller type UK-0604 and UK-0917; in smaller type RU-09, RU-39, RU-40, RU-41, RU-49; in smaller type DE-10, DE-12, DE-13, DE-18, DE-26, DE-32, DE-35, DE-39; NL-12, NL-24, NL-40 as well as in smaller type NL-09; PL-12; in smaller type FR-0714, FR-0602.
4. Phrases on the cognitive, or conceptual, metaphor WAR IS GAME (cf. Lakoff 1991, Hanusch 2014) (7 occurrences, in 6 countries): NL-13 (*Zelensky | In de rol van zijn leven* ‘Zelensky | In the role of his life’), PL-17 (*Scenariusze wojny* ‘Scripts of war’), DE-41 (*Putins Atom-Poker | Das Spiel mit der Angst* ‘Putin’s nuclear poker | The game with fear’), DE-44 (*Putins Spiel mit der Bombe* ‘Putin’s game with the bomb’), US-0311 (*Putin’s endgame* ‘Putin’s endgame’), IN-0413 (*Russian roulette*), BR-11 (*Jogos de guerra* ‘War games’). — In France and the UK, this occurs only before the invasion of Russia (FR-0203 *Jeux de guerre* ‘War games’, UK-0129 *Russia’s roulette*).
 5. Citations (7 occurrences, in 5 countries): 3 times AT, namely AT-14 (person related to war crimes, nationality unclear), AT-30 (whistleblower on Panama Papers and Russian government), AT-39 (Russian reservist); once each in UK, SE, NL and HU, namely UK-0319 (confession of friendship; can be attributed to Putin or Xi) SE-12 (security expert), NL-40 (Putin), HU-24 (Ukrainian foreign minister).
 6. Alliterations (only 4 occurrences, in 4 countries, but together with partial alliterations 8 times, in 6 countries): We clearly find this on AT-13 (*Willkommen in Wien!* ‘Welcome to Vienna!’), DE-10 (*Kampf um Kiew* ‘Battle for Kiev’), IN-0413 (*Russian roulette*) ad UK-1217 (*The Winter War*); additional partial alliterations can be found on SE-40 (*Pangpangthriller om Putin där allt är på riktigt* ‘Pangpang thriller about Putin where everything is real’, with an onomatopoeic constituent *pangpang*), PL-20 (*Wojna według Franciszka* ‘The war according to Francis’) as well as NL-09 (Subtitle: *Hoe het Westen wakker wordt in de wereld van Poetin* ‘How the West is waking up to Putin’s world’), NL-10 (*Poetins pad naar oorlog* ‘Putin’s path to war’).

Fig. 5 summarizes the distribution. It can be seen that the formal-content puns are typically European (excluding the western edge of Portugal and Britain). Elements of the conceptual metaphor WAR IS GAME occur in Germany and the Netherlands, but mainly in the non-European area (US, Brazil, India).

Style	BR	AR	US	UK	PT	IT	NL	FR	DE	AT	SI	HU	PL	SE	RU	IN	CN
1						+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+		
2		+		+								+	+	+			
3			+	+	+			+	+	+	+		+		+		
4	+		+				+		+							+	
5				+			+			+		+		+			
6				+			+		+	+			+	+		+	
Σ	1	1	2	4	1	1	4	2	4	4	1	3	4	4	2	2	0

Fig. 5: Distribution of Stylistic Devices


3.4. Analysis 4

We will now compare our findings with the geographical model of Europragmatic feature as illustrated in the metaphorical Europragmatic bumblebee flight presented in prior studies (Grzega 2013: 108). For the comparison, we will define—as in these prior studies—a feature as “European” if it occurs in at least two-thirds of the selected European countries (war rhetoric principles #2, 3, 4,

5, 9 and the stylistic devices of puns and questions) would reflect the distribution illustrated in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 (the dark level indicates the number of features). Here, a comparison could then be made also here shows that Portugal has fewer Europragmatic features, while Russia does not deviate from the majority of European countries. What is astonishing, though, is the low “European” character of Slovenian.

	BR	AR	US	UK	PT	IT	NL	FR	DE	AT	SI	HU	PL	SE	RU	IN	CN
WRP2				+		+	+		+			+	+	+	+		
WRP3	+	+	(+)			+	+	+	+	+		(+)	+	(+)			
WRP4				+			+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+		
WRP5	+			+	+		+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+		
WRP9			+	+		+	+	+	+	+		+	+				
St1						+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+		
St3			+	+	+			+	+	+	+		+		+		
Σ	2	1	2.5	6	2	4	6	6	7	6	1	5.5	7	4.5	5	0	0

Fig. 6: Distribution of “European” War-Rhetoric Principles and Stylistic Devices



(darker shades of gray = more types of Europragmatic features used)

Fig. 7: Distribution of Europragmatic Features of Geopolitical Cover Pages

4. Summary and Outlook

The research questions can be answered as follows:

- #1. How many covers deal with the topic “West-Ukraine-Russia” in the selected period? — In the 45 weeks from 24 February 2022 to 31 December 2022, there are 124 cover texts in the 17 countries studied, most of them in the European countries considered political engines, Germany (18), France (15), UK (12), Poland (11 each) and Russia (10). Austria also has 11 texts. The lowest numbers are in China (0), India (1), Argentina (1) and Portugal (2). The low number in Portugal as an EU country may be surprising; however, it should be remembered that only the texts that accompany an image as an eye-catcher were counted here. Three other issues of the Portuguese magazine do have relevant texts in small type on the front page, but not with a picture.
- #2.1 How is the rough semantic (connotative) orientation of the cover texts distributed? — Among the media that showed relevant cover texts in more than 20% of the weeks, the following can be said: The newspapers of the large EU countries Germany and France published predominantly pro-Western/anti-Russian titles (including those titles critical of

too lax pro-Western/anti-Russian government policies). The Russian magazine carried mostly descriptive-objective, or emotionally neutral, covertexts.

- #2.2.a. What finer semantic aspects appear clustered? — Of the war rhetoric principles according to Ponsonby, the most prominent are: #2 (The opposite party alone is guilty of war.), #3 (The [leader of the] enemy is inherently evil and resembles the devil.), #4 (We defend a noble cause, not our own interests), #5 (Our cause is sacred), #9 (The enemy commits atrocities on purpose; our mishaps are involuntary.). Moreover, there was an additional war-rhetoric principle #11: Diplomacy is ridiculous.
- #2.2.b. How are these rhetorical principles distributed? — The German, Polish, Dutch, British, and French cover texts have most used the war rhetoric principles.
- #3.a. What stylistic devices occur in clusters? — There are mainly puns and questions in the covertexts of many countries. Quotations, graphic games, alliteration, and elements of the conceptual metaphor WAR IS GAME also appear.
- #3.b. How are these distributed? — The puns are typically European (excluding the western edge Portugal and Britain). Elements of the conceptual metaphor WAR IS GAME occur in Germany and the Netherlands, but are mainly found in the non-European area (US, Brazil, India).
- #4. Do the geographical findings match with previous Europragmatic observations? — By and large, yes. A surprise is the low degree of “Europeanness” in the Slovenian source. This should encourage to do further Eurolinguistic research to get a more finetuned picture of European pragmlinguistic features. Of course, the observations here serve specifically to characterize Europe in terms of media language.

As already said, further studies could supplement these analyses. Here are some ideas: inclusion of other magazines (printed or online); inclusion of other countries; inclusion of the front pages of daily newspapers; a more rigorous combinatory view of both text and picture; a verification of the descriptive-objective coverlines (whether the descriptions are truthful or not?).

What other consequences may be drawn from the observations of these studies should be left open. However, two ideas may be mentioned:

1. It may simply serve the linguistic characterization of front pages and the raising of awareness around such techniques to be shown by teachers—in the sense of New Peace Linguistics (Curtis 2017 & 2022, Grzega 2022).
2. The results could be used for peace journalism according to Galtung (1986, 2006) or in the sense of Wolfsfeld’s (2004) dynamic model, according to which journalists reinforce the elite consensus. They may also be correlated to the results of surveys such as the one by Ipsos (2023). Of course, the wishes of the Ukrainian leadership and the Ukrainian people (at least the vast mass) must be taken into account. Thus, at the time this article is written, Zelensky’s decree prohibiting diplomatic activities with Putin is still in effect (URL24). However, since diplomacy usually plays a crucial role at some point in the course of a war, once the idea of peace spreads among elites, journalists could draw inspiration from the means discovered here to help ensure that ceasefires and peace can emerge more quickly.

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first version received 20 September 2023
revised version received 28 October 2023